Journal Articles

[Published in Korean Journals (in English)]

Book Review


[Abstract] (Committee: Owen Flanagan, Gopal Sreenivasan (co-chairs), David B. Wong, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong)

Having good relationships with our family members and friends is an important part of human flourishing. My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships by taking my own version of a virtue-ethical approach to this topic. For this purpose, I analyze ideal intimate relationships in terms of what I call “relational virtues,” which are the virtues required for each participant in relation to the other participant in the given relationship. The paradigmatic examples of relational virtue I discuss include filial piety and the virtue of friendship.



Works in Progress (draft available upon request:

  • “Autonomy and Non-Intrusion” (with Dave Wendler)
  • “Duty, Virtue, and Filial Love”
  • “Vices in Autonomous Paternalism: The Case of Advance Directives and Dementia Patients” (R&R)

[Abstract] In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self’s life. In particular, I argue that this case can manifest vices such as disdainfulness, intellectual arrogance, and self-dictatorship, which is the vice of trying to control one’s life to an excessive degree, and that a self-dictator fails to give due moral consideration to the future self’s liberty or agency. I then introduce the Daoist idea of wu-wei, which recommends embracement of what happens in one’s life, as one of the possible remedies for the overemphasis on the value of autonomy and control.

  • “Friendly Hope and Epistemic Partiality” (under review)

[Abstract] We often seem to be epistemically partial in forming beliefs about our friends who are near and dear to us. Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud argue that good friendship not only often accompanies such differential epistemic practices, but also demand them at least sometimes. Good friendship, they say, sometimes demands some sort of epistemic partiality that is objectionable from an epistemic point of view. This paper aims to examine the relationship between friendship and epistemic partiality. First, I argue that what good friendship involves as its constituent part is not epistemic partiality per se, but what I call friendly hope. Second, I address the concern that friendship can be an epistemic vice, since, even if it does not demand epistemically objectionable partiality, it frequently gives rise to such partiality. Finally, I argue that the epistemic partiality associated with friendship is not epistemically objectionable as it first appears.

  • “Mozi on Inclusive Care and Filial Piety”

[Abstract]  In this paper, my main aim is to give a plausible interpretation of how Mozi’s doctrine of inclusive care ‘jian ai (兼愛)’ is to be harmonized with filial piety (xiao 孝). I examine how this doctrine is to be practiced in relation to special relationships, especially a parent-child relationship. As a background work, I briefly analyze the meaning of basic concepts in the Mozi. Next, I provide evidence that Mozi endorses the significant special relationships and regards filial piety as an important relational virtue. And then I suggest a possible interpretation of Mohist doctrine which can reconcile the apparent conflict between caring for everyone inclusively and being filial to one’s own parents. Finally, I compare Mohist view on filial piety with Mengzi’s view, and conclude by showing where their disagreement actually lies.

  • “Trustfulness as a Risky Virtue”

[Abstract] After Annette Baier’s seminal works on trust, there have been a considerable number of studies on this important topic. Most of these studies, however, have focused on trust or trustworthiness, but there has been little, if any, study on trustfulness as the trait of a person who trusts well or wisely, that is, a good truster’s virtue. My aim in this paper is to shed some light on the nature and value of this neglected but important virtue of trustfulness. First, I briefly introduce the nature of trust and trust relationships and explain why they are essentially risky. Second, I examine the nature of trustfulness, comparing it with other traits such as distrustfulness, credulity, and prudent reliance. Finally, I argue that its attitudinal element of respecting the trustee’s free will and caring about her as a person is what distinguishes trustfulness from other traits.

  • “Virtue, Virtuous Activity, and Moral Self-Indulgence”
  • “Explanation and the Pragmatic”
  • “Rousseau on Human Nature: Pity and Amour-Propre
  • “Kant on Virtue and Moral Pleasure”